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Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens in Patent Infringement 
Actions: A Uniform Approach Toward the Situs 
of the Tort 
David Wille 
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by 
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may 
have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to 
reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted. 1 
Each year, U.S. businesses lose billions of dollars in sales to foreign 
competitors who have copied American inventions.2 In the last dec-
ade, motivated by threats to the United States' competitiveness by for-
eign corporations that thrive on copying U.S. technology,3 Congress 
and federal courts have revolutionized the protection of intellectual 
property rights, particularly patent rights.4 Despite the recent empha-
sis on protecting intellectual property rights, remaining jurisdictional 
loopholes may allow aliens to escape the revolution's impact. 
In the wake oflarge losses caused by foreign copying of inventions, 
Congress realized that "strong foreign competition derives in large 
measure from weak intellectual property protection."5 This apprecia-
tion produced dramatic results. In 1982, prompted by the negative 
attitude of many federal courts toward patents, Congress created the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 6 This new court has strin-
gently guarded the rights of patent owners. Prior to 1982, federal 
courts held only about thirty percent of patents valid; today, nearly 
eighty percent of patents challenged are ultimately found valid.7 Fed-
eral courts and Congress continue to strengthen intellectual property 
rights in an attempt to extend the reach of these rights to more activi-
ties of alien corporations. 8 United States patent holders will find suits 
1. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961). 
2. Paula Dwyer et al., The Battle Raging Over "Intellectual Property," Bus. WK., May 2, 
1989, at 78, 78 (The United States International Trade Commission estimates the annual loss at 
$61 billion.). 
3. Raymond D. Foltz & Thomas A. Penn, The Perils of Patent Infringement, MACHINE DE· 
SIGN, Apr. 12, 1990, at 105, 105 (observing that Congress strengthened patent laws in response to 
such threats). 
4. Norm Alster, New Profits from Patents, FORTUNE, Apr. 25, 1988, at 185; see also Dwyer 
et al., supra note 2, at 78-79. 
5. Alster, supra note 4, at 188. 
6. See id. 
7. Dwyer et al., supra note 2, at 79. 
8. Foltz & Penn, supra note 3, at 105 ("[J]udicial and legislative initiatives have altered the 
way American companies view patent infringement."); Jon Connole, Law Firms Pushing to De· 
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against alien corporations for patent infringement increasingly neces-
sary to prevent further losses in competitiveness, and to protect their 
intellectual property rights. 
One might assume that the revolution in patent protection would 
also lead to lower jurisdictional barriers to suit. In the area of per-
sonal jurisdiction over alien infringers,9 however, significant barriers 
remain. 10 Because jurisdictional barriers to suit against alien infring-
ers may thwart the recent initiatives of Congress, the reasoning used to 
support these jurisdictional decisions merits careful examination. This 
Note considers the common jurisdictional problem of obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over an alien infringer who sells infringing products 
to a U.S. distributor outside of the United States, who, in tum, resells 
the infringing products in the United States.1 1 
The importance of obtaining a judgment against an alien in this 
paradigmatic setting cannot be overstated. The alien manufacturer is 
the source of supply. If the patent owner does not cut off that source, 
the possibility of future infringement remains. 12 Judgments against 
U.S. distributors are unlikely to prevent future infringement because 
alien infringers can easily find new distributors. 13 Venue or personal 
jurisdiction restrictions also may make joining all of the distributors in 
a single suit diffi.cult. 14 In addition, the alien source of supply may be 
velop Intellectual Property Practices, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND Bus., Sept. 18, 1989, at 4, 4 (Due to 
foreign competition, Congress has passed 14 laws strengthening intellectual property rights since 
1983.); Elizabeth Corcoran, Likely Litigation; Companies Wield Lawsuits as a Market-Develop-
ment Tool, Sci. AM., Mar. 1990, at 76, 76 (Congress strengthened patent protection against 
aliens in a 1988 trade act.); Merrill Goozner, More Global Patent Litigation Seen, CHI. TulB., 
May 3, 1989, § 3, at 3 (Courts are more willing to grant preliminary injunctions against alien 
infringers.). 
9. For purposes of this Note, the term "alien infringer" refers to a nonresident alien who 
manufactures products outside of the United States which infringe a U.S. patent when sold in the 
United States. 
10. See, e.g., Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over alien infringer). 
11. See Clinton Neagley, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Inducers of Infringement, 58 
J. PAT. OFF. SocY. 712 (1976). This paradigm case differs from a case where the United States 
distributor can be considered the alter ego of the alien corporation, as is often the case when the 
distributor is a subsidiary of the alien corporation. When the distributor is an alter ego, the alien 
is deemed to act wherever its alter ego acts and, therefore, normally does business in the United 
States. See, e.g., Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Sys., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1576, 1581, 
9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1809, 1812 (N.D. Ga. 1988). An alien corporation with such an alter ego subjects 
itself to personal jurisdiction wherever it is deemed to be doing business. See infra note 30. 
12. Alan D. Rosenthal, Venue and Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations in Patent 
and Trademark Suits, 1980 PAT. L. ANN. 147, 147 (1980) ("Often, any relief obtained in a suit 
which does not include the foreign manufacturer proves to be disappointing, for the foreign 
manufacturer, Hydra-like, will locate new local distributors."). 
13. Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 729, 179 U.S.P.Q. 486, 
490 (D, Utah 1973); Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 147. 
14. See Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 134 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (no single venue 
proper for all distributor-defendants). Although an amendment to the general statute, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West Supp. 1991), as interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 
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the only defendant available to make a lawsuit economically feasible 
because the alien manufacturer would almost always be liable for the 
most damages. This holds true especially where a large number of 
distributors have each made a small percentage of the total sales. Ju-
risdictional barriers to suing aliens, therefore, interfere with congres-
sional efforts to protect U.S. patent holders from foreign infringers and 
create incentives for alien companies to manufacture infringing prod-
ucts overseas. 
This Note examines current approaches to the question of personal 
jurisdiction over alien patent infringers. Part I describes personal ju-
risdiction requirements in the context of patent infringement suits 
against aliens. The leading case addressing these requirements has 
been interpreted differently by several courts, thus resulting in conflict-
ing outcomes. Part II explains the current controversy over the locus 
of the tort of patent infringement. The three different modes of rea-
soning currently used by courts to determine the locus of the tort 
would allow immunity from suit for the alien in at least two hypotheti-
cal cases. This Part concludes that in order to prevent the possibility 
of immunity in such situations, the courts should carefully choose and 
apply the same approach to the locus of the tortious injury. Part III 
examines the theories behind two competing approaches to the locus 
of the tortious injury and argues for the uniform adoption of a single 
rule. This Note concludes that courts should deem the tort to occur 
where the distributor made the infringing sales. 
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN lNFRINGERS 
Anyone other than the patent holder who "makes, uses, or sells 
any patented invention, within the United States ... infringes the pat-
ent." 15 This type of infringement is called direct infringement. 16 
Although an alien corporation that sells its product to distributors 
outside of the territorial United States cannot be guilty of direct in-
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991), eased venue restrictions somewhat, the 
problem of joining all distributors in a single action persists. Johnson Gas held that a 1988 
amendment to 28 U.S.C.A. § 139l(c) (Supp. 1991) applies to the term "reside" as the term is 
used in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988). Under this decision, venue is 
proper in a patent infringement case involving a defendant corporation wherever that corpora· 
tion is subject to personal jurisdiction, thus creating more possible venues in most cases involving 
corporate defendants. Yet because one can easily imagine a case where multiple distributors 
would not all be subject to personal jurisdiction in the same district, the venue problem remains. 
In addition, this statute only affects venue for corporations; venue for individuals remains 
unaffected. 
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988). 
16. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 522-25, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769, 
771-72 (1972) (discussing the concepts of direct, induced, and contributory infringement). 
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fringement, 17 it may be held liable for inducing infringement18 in such 
a case.19 As noted by Professor Chisum, one commits inducement by 
"actively and knowingly aiding and abetting another's direct infringe-
ment of a patent."20 Both types of patent infringement actions must 
satisfy the three jurisdictional requirements applicable to any federal 
lawsuit: venue, subject matter jurisdiction, and personaljurisdiction.21 
Aliens usually do not contest venue or subject matter jurisdiction. 
Venue is proper in any federal district in a patent infringement suit 
against an alien, 22 and the federal district courts have original subject 
matter jurisdiction over all patent actions.23 The personal jurisdiction 
requirement, however, is a much-contested legal barrier. Section I.A 
describes the problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction over an alien 
patent infringer. Section I.B then explains the leading case addressing 
the personal jurisdiction question, from which two competing theories 
as to the locus of the tortious injury emerge. 
17. See Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 525-31, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 772-74 (holding that it is 
not an infringement of a patent to make, use, or sell a patented product outside of the United 
States because Congress did not intend the patent infringement statute to have extraterritorial 
effect). 
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1988) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer."). 
19. E.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1485, 1488, 225 
U.S.P.Q. 929, 931 (D. Del. 1985). Direct infringement must occur in the United States before an 
action for inducement can be brought. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 
F.2d 1137, 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387, 390 (7th Cir. 1975) (" '[A)ctive inducement' may be found in 
events outside the United States if they result in a direct infringement here."); Deepsouth Packing 
Co., 406 U.S. at 526, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 772 (stating that there can be no contributory infringement 
without direct infringement). At least one decision suggests that when the alien knows the in-
fringing product will reach the United States, the alien is guilty of inducement of infringement. 
Keams v. Wood Motors Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
20. 4 DONALDS. CHISUM, PATENTS§ 17.04, at 17-44.2 (1991). 
21. JONATHON M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 3-11 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the 
jurisdictional requirements applicable to any federal lawsuit). 
22. Venue in patent infringement suits is normally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988), 
which allows an action to commence where the defendant resides or where the defendant does 
business, provided acts of infringement occurred there. The Supreme Court previously held that 
"28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement 
actions .... " Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229, 113 U.S.P.Q. 
234, 237 (1957). Strict adherence to this holding, however, would immunize most aliens from 
suit for patent infringement because most alien infringers do not do business in the United States. 
See Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 710, 174 U.S.P.Q. 1, 3-4 (1972) 
(holding that application of the patent venue statute to alien defendants would deprive the court 
of jurisdiction granted by Congress). The Supreme Court therefore modified its original holding 
to allow the more general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 139l(d) (1988), to govern patent infringe-
ment suits against an alien. Brunette Mach. Works, 406 U.S. at 714, 174 U.S.P.Q. at 4. Under 
this statute, an alien may be sued in any federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 139I(d) (1988). 
Therefore, in a patent infringement suit against an alien, venue is proper in any district court. 
Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 148 ("[T)here are no venue considerations with respect to alien 
corporations."). 
23. 28 u.s.c. § 1338 (1988). 
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A. Personal Jurisdiction 
When a patent holder sues an alien for patent infringement, ob-
taining personal jurisdiction over the alien is the primary jurisdictional 
barrier.24 Federal courts must follow traditional personal jurisdiction 
doctrine in such cases.25 A federal court may exercise personal juris-
diction over a defendant when two requirements are met: (1) a statute 
must authorize service of process26 and (2) the defendant must have 
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.' "27 In patent cases, because no federal statute au-
thorizing service of process exists, service must be made under the 
long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court sits.28 Federal 
courts must apply the statute in the same manner state courts would 
apply it.29 
Typical long-arm statutes provide for jurisdiction over any party 
who commits a tort within the state.30 To apply these statutes, courts 
must determine the legal situs of the tort. Because patent infringe-
ment is a tort, 31 a court ordinarily obtains personal jurisdiction over 
24. Rita M. Irani, Jurisdiction and Venue in Patent Cases: Effect of the Federal Circuit on 
Construction of the Patent Venue Statute, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SocY. 445, 445 (1987); 
Neagley, supra note 11, at 713. 
25. See, e.g .. Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 134 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (stating re-
quirements for personal jurisdiction in a patent infringement case). 
26. Omni Capital Intl. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). 
27. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted). 
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (If no federal rule exists, then service may "be made under the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the [state] statute or rule."); Omni Capital Intl. v. 
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 101-04 (1987). As one commentator has written, "[t]he term 
'long-arm statute' refers to state statutes which confer upon state courts personal jurisdiction 
over out-of-state defendants who do business in the state or commit any of a series of enumerated 
acts either within the state or outside the state with consequences in-state." Jon Heller, Note, 
Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 113 n.7 
(1989). For an example of a court asserting jurisdiction over a patent infringement defendant 
under a long-arm statute, see Graham Eng. Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 195 
U.S.P.Q. 267 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
29. LANDERS ET AL, supra note 21, at 127; see Omni Capital Intl. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 
U.S. 97, 101-04 (1987). 
30. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ~ 2-209 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 600.715 (1979); 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302 (McKinney 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 17.042 
(West 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 1977). These statutes typically also provide for 
jurisdiction over any corporation doing business in the state. In a patent infringement suit 
against an alien, jurisdiction under a "doing business" provision is atypical and uninteresting. 
Normally, an alien is only deemed to be doing business when it has an alter ego in the United 
States. In this rare circumstance, the court can take jurisdiction over the alien under the doing 
business provision of the long-arm statute. See supra note 11. 
31. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931); Honey-
well, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387, 390 (7th Cir. 1975); 
Keams v. Wood Motors Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 488 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Engineered Sports 
Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 726, 179 U.S.P.Q. 486, 488 (D. Utah 1973); Rosen· 
thal, supra note 12, at ISO; Neagley, supra note 11, at 715. 
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the alien defendant under such a long-arm provision. 32 Courts have 
also determined that inducement of infringement is a tort because in-
ducement essentially requires "aiding and abetting" the direct in-
fringer. 33 Because they consider inducement to be an integral part of 
the corresponding direct infringement, courts deem both torts to have 
been committed at the place of the direct infringement. 34 Conse-
quently, federal courts may use a tort long-arm provision to reach 
alien infringers, because the acts of inducement need not occur in the 
United States.35 Although the above principles are well established, 
determining the location of the direct infringement tort remains a diffi-
cult issue. 
B. The Root of the Controversy - Honeywell v. Metz 
Apparatewerke 
The leading appellate case upholding long-arm jurisdiction over an 
alien infringer is Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke. 36 Honey-
well's importance lies in the court's discussion of the situs of the tort of 
patent infringement. In this case, the alien defendant's U.S. distribu-
tor sold infringing goods in Illinois. The state long-arm statute pro-
vided for jurisdiction over one who commits "a tortious act within 
[Illinois]."37 Illinois courts interpreted this statute to mean that "the 
situs of the tort is the place where the injury occurs. " 38 The appellate 
court in Honeywell held that the infringement Honeywell alleged was a 
tortious act committed within Illinois, consonant with the meaning of 
the state long-arm statute.39 Consequently, the court concluded that 
Honeywell had suffered tortious injury in Illinois. This section dis-
cusses the implications of this case. 
Honeywell brought suit against Metz, the manufacturer; two U.S. 
distributors; and a U.S. retailer for infringing its patent on a photo-
graphic flash unit.40 Metz sold its flash units F.O.B.41 a "German sea-
port or German border" to the U.S. distributors.42 Metz also 
32. E.g., Honeywell, 509 F.2d at 1141-42, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390-91. 
33. Honeywell, 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390; Kearns 204 U.S.P.Q. at 489; Engi-
neered Sports Prods., 362 F. Supp. at 727, 179 U.S.P.Q. at 489; see also Neagley, supra note 11, at 
715. 
34. See Honeywell, 509 F.2d at 1142, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 391. 
35. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
36. 509 F.2d 1137, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387 (7th Cir. 1975); see 6 CHISUM, supra note 20, 
§ 21.02[3], at 21-104 (Honeywell is a "leading decision."). 
37. 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390. 
38. 509 F.2d at 1142, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390. 
39. 509 F.2d at 1142, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 391. 
40. 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388. 
41. F.O.B. (free on board) refers to the location where title to goods passes from the seller to 
the buyer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 642 (6th ed. 1990); see u.c.c. § 2-319(1) (1977). 
42. 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389. 
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promised to indemnify its distributor for any damages due to patent 
infringement.43 Honeywell filed suit in the Northern District of Illi-
nois because the retailer and one distributor sold a significant number 
of Metz products there.44 The district court dismissed the suit against 
Metz for want of personal jurisdiction.4s Honeywell appealed, claim-
ing that jurisdiction was proper under the tortious act provision of the 
Illinois long-arm statute. 46 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that 
jurisdiction over Metz was proper in light of the requirements of both 
the long-arm statute and due process.47 The court of appeals held that 
Honeywell had indeed suffered tortious injury in Illinois. Therefore, 
Metz's infringement constituted a tortious act committed in Illinois. 
This holding lends itself to two possible interpretations. First, the 
court may have meant that the injury occurred where infringing sales 
were made because such sales caused tortious injury at the place of the 
sale. In support of this interpretation, the court's discussion of patent 
infringement referred to an earlier decision which suggested that in-
fringing a patent in Illinois constitutes a tortious act in that state.48 In 
this context, the Honeywell court noted that distributors of Metz prod-
ucts made infringing sales in the state.49 Alternatively, the court may 
have meant that the injury occurred where the patent owner resides 
because the patent owner suffered economic harm and damage to her 
intellectual property rights there. The court's analysis of due process 
requirements supports this position. Here, the court noted that in-
-fringement caused injury to Honeywell, which had its principal place 
of business in Illinois. so 
At least one leading commentator noted that Honeywell left the 
issue of where the tort of patent infringement occurs "implicitly or 
explicitly" unresolved.s1 Both interpretations of Honeywell are plausi-
ble, as demonstrated by the competing constructions made by district 
courts.s2 Although Honeywell created a two-way federal split of au-
thority over the situs of patent infringement, some federal courts must 
follow a third approach due to substantive variations among state 
43. 509 F.2d at 1140, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389. 
44. See 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388. 
45. 509 F.2d at 1140-41, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389. 
46. 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 389-90. The Illinois long-arm statute has been recently 
amended and the paragraph number of the current statute has changed since 1975. The current 
provision, identical to that applied in Honeywell, is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ~ 2-209(2) (1990). 
47. 509 F.2d at 1141-45, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390-92. 
48. 509 F.2d at 1141, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390. 
49. 509 F.2d at 1141-42, 1144, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 390, 392. 
50. 509 F.2d at 1144, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 392. 
51. 6 CHISUM, supra note 20, § 21.02[3), at 21-105. 
52. Compare Acrison Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (interpreting Honeywell to mean that the injury occurs where the patent 
owner resides) with Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (inter-
preting Honeywell to mean that the injury occurs where infringing sales are made). 
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long-arm statutes. Some states have chosen the place of the tortious 
act as the situs of the tort, thereby making the place of infringing sales 
the situs of the tort of patent infringement. 
The question of whether states should focus on the tortious act or 
tortious injury to determine the situs of the tort is beyond the scope of 
this Note. This question only arises because different states interpret 
their long-arm statutes in different ways. Because federal courts must 
apply state long-arm statutes as interpreted by state courts, 53 federal 
courts cannot resolve this question. Furthermore, a new interpreta-
tion of a long-arm statute has broad implications for all tort actions, 
extending far beyond the narrow question of which interpretation is 
proper for patent infringement. As a practical matter, resolving this 
question may be impossible. Proper resolution of the split of authority 
created by Honeywell, however, may dispense with the need to resolve 
this issue. 
This Note argues that the Honeywell split should be resolved in 
favor of locating the irljury of patent infringement where infringing 
sales are made. This conclusion renders the question of whether states 
should focus on the tortious act or tortious injury moot, because, 
under the suggested resolution of the Honeywell split, both the act and 
injury are deemed to occur at the same place - the place of the in-
fringing sales. 54 In addition, resolution of the Honeywell split would 
provide a uniform outcome with no additional implications beyond the 
narrow scope of patent infringement. Thus, the problem created by 
the Honeywell split can be resolved by focusing judicial inquiry on the 
true situs of the injury in a patent infringement action. 
II. THREE VARYING APPROACHES TO DETERMINING THE SITUS 
OF THE TORT 
The Honeywell court necessarily focused on where the plaintiff had 
suffered tortious injury, because, under the Illinois long-arm statute, 
the situs of the tort is the place where the tortious injury occurred. 
However, some states have interpreted their long-arm statutes differ-
ently, considering the situs of the tort to be the place where the tor-
tious act occurred. 55 As noted above, federal courts are bound to 
follow states' interpretations of their long-arm statutes, even in the 
context of a federal cause of action such as patent infringement. 56 
53. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
54. Section 111.C.3 of this Note argues that this outcome provides one practical reason for 
resolving the Honeywell split in this manner. Federal courts may resolve this split because there 
is no state authority as to where the injury of patent infringement occurs. Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) (1988), the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement suits. 
Therefore, the split of authority over the situs of the tortious injury is purely federal. 
55. E.g., Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 135-36 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
56. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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When states interpret the long-arm statute to focus on the tortious act, 
the situs of the tort is where the infringing sales were made. 57 
Although this result is consistent with the first interpretation of Hon-
eywell, the path to the result differs. Therefore, three conflicting rules 
currently govern the situs of the tort of patent infringement. 
Sections II.A, 11.B, and 11.C of this Part present the three compet-
ing theories of where the tort occurs: the "Injury at Place of Patent" 
rule, the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule, and the "Act of 
Infringement" rule. The first two approaches, which result from the 
conflicting interpretations of the Honeywell case, concentrate on the 
locus of the tortious injury due to the underlying state long-arm stat-
ute's substantive focus on the tortious injury. The third approach con-
centrates on the locus of the tortious act due to the underlying state 
long-arm statute's substantive focus on the tortious act. Section 11.D 
illustrates the difficulties which can arise when the three methods of 
analysis are applied under various state long-arm provisions. 
A. The ''Injury at Place of Patent" Approach 
Federal courts that must determine the situs of a tort by focusing 
on where the plaintiff suffers injury can adopt either of the two alter-
native interpretations of Honeywell. The first, the "Injury at Place of 
Patent" rule, allows a court to obtain personal jurisdiction in the dis-
trict whe(e the patent holder resides.58 
A paradigmatic case59 of alien infringement, Acrison, Inc. v. Con-
trol and Metering Ltd., 60 illustrates this mode of reasoning. In Ac-
rison, the patent holder, Acrison, Inc., brought suit against Brabender 
Technologie KG, a German corporation; its Canadian distributor, 
Control and Metering Limited (CML); and Control and Metering, 
Inc.(CMI), CML's U.S. subsidiary. 61 Acrison sued in Illinois because 
CMI had an established place of business there. Acrison neither did 
business in Illinois, nor was incorporated there. 62 Brabender delivered 
the infringing products to CML F.O.B. Germany.63 TheAcrison court 
held that it did not have jurisdiction over Brabender because Acrison's 
tortious injury did not occur in Illinois. 64 The court implicitly recog-
nized that a patent constitutes an intangible property interest created 
57. See, e.g., Huche/, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 135-36; see also infra section II.C. 
58. See, e.g., Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448-49, 14 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1836 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
60. 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
61. 730 F. Supp. at 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1833-34. 
62. 730 F. Supp. at 1448, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836. 
63. 730 F. Supp. at 1446, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1834. For a definition of F.O.B., see supra note 
41. 
64. 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836. 
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by federal law, 65 with a necessarily fictional situs. 
Courts following the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule consider the 
residence of the owner as the most appropriate situs of this interest. 66 
Consequently, the Acrison court held that Acrison suffered tortious 
injury to its intangible property rights at the corporation's residence, 
the fictional situs of the property, 67 as well as economic harm which 
had its impact at the residence. 68 Although the Acrison court charac-
terized both injuries as occurring at the residence of the patent holder, 
these injuries may be viewed with equal plausibility as occurring where 
infringing sales are made. 
B. The ''Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" Approach 
The second rule arising out of the Honeywell split, the "Injury at 
Place of Infringing Sales" approach, dictates that a court may assert 
personal jurisdiction where the defendant made infringing sales be-
cause the patent owner suffers harm there. 69 Interface Biomedical 
Laboratories v. Axiom Medical, Inc. 70 illustrates this method of rea-
soning. Here, the patent holder, Interface, brought a patent infringe-
ment suit in the Eastern District of New York against Axiom, a 
California corporation. 71 Although Axiom had not sold infringing 
products in New York, 72 Interface argued that the court could exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over Axiom because Interface, a New York 
corporation, suffered both economic injury and damage to its intellec-
tual property rights there. 73 The Interface court disagreed, reasoning 
that economic injury occurs where sales are lost, 74 and that intangible 
property has no jurisdictional significance.75 Although the Interface 
court refused to attribute jurisdictional significance to the intangible, 
65. Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255, 259, 217 U.S.P.Q. 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1982). 
66. E.g., Horne, 684 F.2d at 259, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 19; Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448, 14 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836 (damage to intellectual property takes place where the owner resides). 
67. For another example of a court focusing on the patent owner's residence as the situs of 
the patent, see Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 299 n. 12, 226 U.S.P.Q. 305, 311-
12 n.12 (3d Cir. 1985). 
68. Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836. 
69. See, e.g., Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 37 
(E.D. Mich. 1976). 
70. 600 F. Supp. 731, 225 U.S.P.Q. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
71. 600 F. Supp. at 732-33, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 146. Although Axiom is a California corpora-
tion, the court's personal jurisdiction analysis under the New York long-arm statute would apply 
if Axiom were an alien. 
72. 600 F. Supp. at 740, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 152. 
73. 600 F. Supp. at 738, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 151. 
74. 600 F. Supp. at 738-39, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 151-52. 
75. 600 F. Supp. at 740, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 152. By "no jurisdictional significance," the Inter-
face court apparently meant one cannot focus on the location of a patent for jurisdictional pur-
poses because, unlike real property, the location of intangible property is impossible to 
determine. This holding is a broad reading of Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
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other courts following the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule 
have done so.76 Unlike courts following the "Injury at Place of Pat-
ent" theory, however, these courts deem the intellectual property in-
jury to be an invasion of rights which occurs "where the infringing 
article is sold or used. "77 
C. The "Act of Infringement" Approach 
In contrast to the "Injury at Place of Patent" and "Injury at Place 
of Infringing Sales" theories, the "Act of Infringement" rule abandons 
the focus on where the tortious injury occurs and instead concentrates 
on where the defendant committed the tortious act. Some state courts 
will exercise jurisdiction under the tort provision of their long-arm 
statute only if the tortious act occurs within the state, regardless of 
where the injury occurs. 78 In the context of patent infringement, sales 
of infringing products constitute the relevant tortious act. 79 However, 
in the paradigmatic case, the alien has not committed direct infringe-
ment. 80 At least one court faced with this situation has upheld juris-
diction over the alien, reasoning that the alien defendant's involvement 
in the acts of infringement suffices to constitute a tortious act in the 
jurisdiction. 81 Implicit in this reasoning is that the alien could be 
found liable for inducing infringement, which is a tort deemed to oc-
cur where infringing sales are made.82 Note that the "Act oflnfringe-
ment" mode of reasoning produces results consistent with the "Injury 
at Place of Infringing Sales" rule, but by a different rationale. 
D. Significance of the Varying Approaches 
Every state has some type of long-arm statute. 83 Whether directly 
76. E.g., Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 488 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (acknowl-
edging that infringement affects a patent owner's rights and citing two decisions that consider 
this injury to occur where infringing sales occur); Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. 
Supp. 1302, 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (acknowledging that the invasion of a 
patent owner's rights occurs where the infringing good is sold or used). 
77. Amburn, 423 F. Supp. at 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 37. 
78. See, e.g., Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 135-36 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
79. See Huche/, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 135-36. The statutory reference to anyone who "makes, uses 
or sells" a patented device, 28 U.S.C. § 27l(a) (1988), gives rise to the argument that the tortious 
act occurs where the infringer manufactures the infringing device. In the paradigmatic case, 
however, an alien infringer manufactures the device outside the United States. Because aliens 
cannot be guilty of direct infringement for acts committed outside the United States, see supra 
note 17 and accompanying text, the tortious act of the manufacturer is not jurisdictionally signifi-
cant. As previously noted, the plaintiff must sue the alien for inducement of infringement. See 
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. Inducement, in this context, constitutes aiding and 
abetting the direct infringer. Thus, the relevant tortious act is the infringing sale. 
80. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. 
81. Huche/, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 135-36. 
82. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
83. ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (1991); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-4-101 (Michie 1987); CAL. 
C1v. PROC. CODE§ 410.10 (Deering 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (1987); CONN. GEN. 
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or indirectly, these statutes allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over 
one who commits a tort within the state. However, what constitutes a 
"tort within the state" varies with each state's interpretation of its stat-
ute; even similarly worded statutes have been interpreted differently. 
As a consequence, either the varying state interpretations, or the Hon-
eywell split of authority over the locus of the patent infringement in-
jury may permit an alien patent infringer to gain immunity from 
suit.84 
Two hypothetical examples illustrate the problem of unintended 
immunity. Assume that a U.S. distributor sells - in significant quan-
ties and only in Illinois - a paradigmatic85 alien's product infringing 
on a Texas corporation's patent. As noted above, the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois follows the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule, reasoning 
that the tortious injury of patent infringement occurs where the owner 
resides, in this case Texas. 86 In contrast, the Southern District of 
Texas follows the "Act of Infringemenf' approach, reasoning that the 
tortious act of infringement takes place where the infringer makes the 
sales, in this case Illinois. 87 In this hypothetical, the district court will 
dismiss the action no matter where the plaintiff sues. The federal dis-
trict court in Illinois, bound to focus on the injury, will consider the 
injury (and the tort) to have occurred in Texas, where the patent 
owner resides. The federal district court in Texas, necessarily focusing 
on the act of infringement, will deem the tort to have occurred in Illi-
nois, where the defendant made infringing sales. In this hypothetical, 
the alien infringer is immune from suit. 
As a second hypothetical, assume that the patent holder resides in 
STAT. § 52-59b (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. ch. 48.193 (Harrison 1988); GA. CooE ANN.§ 9-10-91 (Michie Supp. 199); HAW. REv. 
STAT. § 634-35 (1985); IDAHO CoDE § 5-514 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ~ 2-209 (1989); 
IOWA CoDE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (1983); KY. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 
(West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (1980); Mo. Crs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. 
6-103 (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 223A, § 3 (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.705, 600.715 
(1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West 1988); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1991); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-20-4B (1990); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 510:4 
(Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (1987); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302 (McKinney 
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004 (West Supp. 1990); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (1981); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-2-803 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 15-7-2 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 20-2-214 (Supp. 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 17.042 (West 1986); 
UTAH CODE ANN. 78-27-24 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-328.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §4.28.185 (West 1988); W. VA. 
CODE§ 56-3-33 (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT.§ 801.05 (1977); WYO. STAT.§ 5-1-107 (1990); ALA. 
R. CIV. P. 4.2; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2); IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.4; N.J. CIV. PRACT. R. 4:4-4; N.D. 
R. C1v. P. 4(b); OHIO R. C1v. P. 4.3; OR. R. C1v. P. 4. 
84. For a discussion of the split of authority see notes 51-54 and accompanying text, supra. 
85. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
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the Southern District of New York and, as above, infringing sales have 
been made exclusively in Illinois. The Southern District of New York 
follows the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule. 88 New York's 
approach is distinguished from the Texas approach in that New York 
focuses on where the injury occurs, while Texas focuses on where the 
tortious act occurs. Application of these two modes of reasoning, 
however, produces identical results, because New York federal courts 
consider the patent holder to have sustained injury where the defend-
ant made infringing sales. The result of a patent infringement suit 
against the alien will be the same in this hypothetical as in the previous 
one - immunity from suit for the alien. Again, the Illinois district 
court will dismiss the suit because the patent owner does not reside in 
Illinois. The New York district court, bound to focus on the injury, 
will dismiss the suit because it considers the injury to have occurred in 
Illinois where the defendant made infringing sales. 
These hypotheticals illustrate how the combination of the Honey-
well split and the different substantive foci of state long-arm statutes 
create a jurisdictional "gap," leaving some alien infringers immune 
from suit. The potential for such immunity provides a strong impetus 
for choosing a uniform rule. These hypotheticals also illustrate that, 
for the ultimate determination of whether an alien is subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction, no practical difference exists between the "Act of 
Infringement" and the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" ap-
proaches. As will be explained fully below, this factor provides one 
strong reason to adopt the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" ap-
proach. Even if courts resolve the Honeywell split, therefore, in favor 
of uniform adoption of the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule, immunity 
is still possible because some federal courts must still focus on the tor-
tious act. 
III. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PLACE OF INFRINGING 
SALES APPROACH 
The second hypothetical examined in Part II illustrates the need 
for a uniform view of where the injury from patent infringement oc-
curs. Without a uniform definition, alien infringers may be able to 
evade the patent laws because they are immune from suit. This Part 
examines the reasoning underlying the two theories of the situs of the 
patent infringement injury. Section III.A discusses the nature of the 
injury to the patent owner's intellectual property rights and section 
III.B discusses the nature of the economic injury to the patent owner. 
Both sections conclude that the reasoning behind the "Injury at Place 
of Infringing Sales" approach is superior to the reasoning underlying 
the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach. Section III.C demonstrates 
88. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text. 
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that significant problems would remain under uniform adoption of the 
"Injury at Place of Patent" rule. The "Injury at Place of Infringing 
Sales" approach, by comparison, would not suffer from these deficien-
cies if uniformly adopted. 
A. The Situs of the Injury to the Owner's Patent Rights 
The first injury courts acknowledge in alien infringement cases is 
the injury to the patent holder's intellectual property rights. Courts 
that have addressed the question of where the injury to a patent 
holder's intellectual property rights occurs normally have offered little 
analysis of this issue. Rather, courts on both sides of the issue tend to 
make conclusory statements about the locus of the tort. 89 This section 
demonstrates that harm to a patent holder's rights actually occurs 
where infringing sales are made. 
In Rush v. Savchuk, 90 the Supreme Court noted, in the context of a 
garnishment action, that intangible property has no actual situs and 
can have no jurisdictional significance.91 Although applying this lan-
guage to all forms of intangible property requires a broad reading of 
the Court's holding, at least one court has followed this holding in the 
context of patent infringement.92 On this basis, the location of the 
harm to the patent owner's intangible property rights would be irrele-
vant for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. If this argument is ac-
cepted, the analysis of where the injury occurs would necessarily focus 
on economic injury.93 However, because other courts facing the place 
of injury issue do not appear to have accepted such a broad interpreta-
tion, the nature of the injury to the owner's intellectual property rights 
must also be examined.94 
On its face, the reasoning behind the "Injury at Place of Patent" 
rule is appealing. Patent infringement causes an injury to the patent 
owner's intangible property right.95 The injury to that property right 
should be assigned a legal situs; the residence of the owner is a plausi-
89. See, e.g., Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1303, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 37 
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (The invasion of the patent owner's rights "would occur where the infringing 
article is sold or used or where infringement is induced."); Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering 
Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1836 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Damage to intellec-
tual property rights ... by definition takes place where the owner suffers the damage."). Not 
only is the statement by the Acrison court conclusory, the reasoning is circular. The court was 
trying to determine where the owner suffers the damage. 
90. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
91. 444 U.S. at 330. 
92. Interface Biomedical Lab. v. Axiom Medical, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 731, 740, 225 U.S.P.Q. 
146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Rush, 444 U.S. at 328-30). 
93. See infra section III.B. 
94. See, e.g., Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
95. See supra notes 67 & 76 and accompanying text. The patent owner's right to exclude 
others is damaged by infringement. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
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ble place. Upon closer examination, however, this approach has a 
number of flaws, both in its application and in the way it characterizes 
a patent owner's rights. 
First, the state of a corporation's residence may be unclear; the 
corporation's principal place of business, its state of incorporation, or 
the place of patent assignment are all reasonable choices. The Acrison 
court observed that in Honeywell, the plaintiff was an Illinois corpora-
tion that suffered harm in Illinois.96 In actuality, although Honeywell 
had its principal place of business in Illinois, 97 it was incorporated in 
Delaware.98 Apparently, the Acrison court felt the situs of the patent 
should be in the state of incorporation, while the Honeywell court felt 
the proper situs was the corporation's principal place of business. A 
third possibility also exists - the state of the patent assignment. Be-
cause the patent at issue in Honeywell was assigned to "Honeywell[,] 
Inc., Minneapolis, Minn., a corporation of Delaware.,"99 Minnesota 
might be deemed the situs of the patent. If Honeywell produced its 
patented goods exclusively in Minneapolis, then Minnesota constitutes 
a reasonable choice for the patent's situs because infringement would 
presumably affect this Honeywell plant most directly. As each of 
these locations present reasonable choices, adoption of the "Injury at 
Place of Patent" mode of analysis might still result in a secondary split 
of authority over the situs of the patent. Indeed, given the varying foci 
of the Acrison and Honeywell courts, such a split may already exist. 
Second, the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule makes the questiona-
ble assumption that a patent has a situs. To the contrary, a patent is a 
federally created right, valid throughout the United States. 100 Given 
its national reach, two possible characterizations can be made of the 
patent grant, both of which reject the "Injury at Place of Patent" 
mode of reasoning. The first possibility is that because patent rights 
exist throughout the United States, arguably no identifiable situs ex-
ists. This characterization is a variation of the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Rush v. Savchuk. 101 Under this characterization, the situs of the 
patent has no jurisdictional significance. An alternative characteriza-
tion is that the patent holder has an intangible property right in every 
federal district in the United States.102 Because infringement damages 
96. Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836 (citing Honeywell, Inc. v. 
Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1144, 184 U.S.P.Q. 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
97. Honeywell, Inc., 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388. 
98. Honeywell, Inc., 509 F.2d at 1139, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 388. 
99. U.S. Patent No. RE 26,999 (Dec. 8, 1970); U.S. Patent No. 3,340,426 (Sept. 5, 1967). 
100. 35 u.s.c. § 154 (1988). 
101. 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980). This is a broad interpretation of Rush. Although Rush in· 
volved garnishment of an insurance policy, an area unrelated to intellectual property, at least one 
court has so interpreted the decision. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
102. This characterization is similar to that of the injury in a libel case. A person's reputn· 
tion may be damaged in any jurisdiction where the libel is published. Keeton v. Hustler Maga· 
zine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984). In essence, then, a person has personalty rights in their 
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a different piece of the patent owner's intangible property in each dis-
trict where infringing sales are made, the patent owner would, under 
this interpretation, obtain different causes of action for infringement in 
each district. This characterization supports the "Injury at Place of 
Infringing Sales" approach, as the patent owner obtains separate 
causes of action wherever infringing products are sold. 
Finally, the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule mischaracterizes the 
nature of the patent owner's rights. A patent grants the owner a bun-
dle of property rights.103 The most important component of this bun-
dle is the right to exclude others.104 When infringement occurs, the 
most important injury to the patent owner is infringement of her right 
to exclude. Because infringement occurs at a specific place, the patent 
owner arguably loses the right to exclude there. Infringement is some-
what analogous to trespassing. When one has trespassed on another's 
property, the injury occurs where the right to exclude is lost, not 
where the owner of the property resides. Consequently, the "Injury at 
Place of Infringing Sales" approach more correctly identifies the place 
of damage to the patent owner's property rights. 
This characterization of the patent owner's injury suggests that the 
split of authority over where the injury occurs should be resolved in 
favor of the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule. The "Injury at 
Place of Patent" approach characterizes the injury of patent infringe-
ment in a conclusory fashion as an injury to intangible property with-
out examining the true nature of the injury. Because the patent owner 
truly loses the right to exclude where infringement occurs, the "Injury 
at Place of Infringing Sales" method of reasoning better characterizes 
the injury to the patent owner's intangible property rights. 
B. The Situs of the Owner's Economic Injury 
The second injury that courts focus on to determine where the in-
jury occurs is economic harm to the patent holder. The "Injury at 
Place of Patent" method of analysis posits that economic harm occurs 
at the residence of the patent holder because the patent owner suffers 
reputation in every state. At least one court has noted that intangible intellectual property rights 
are similar to personalty rights, such as reputation. Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 
730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 n.7, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1836 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Suprisingly, applica-
tion of the above reasoning would contradict the Acrison court's holding; it is unclear why the 
court chose to make this analogy. 
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). 
104. The right to exclude others is the essence of the human right called "property." The 
right to exclude others from free use of an invention protected by a valid patent does not 
differ from the right to exclude others from free use of one's automobile, crops, or other 
items of personal property .... That one human property right may be challenged by tres-
pass, another by theft, and another by infringement, does not affect the fundamental indi-
cium of all "property," i.e., the right to exclude others. 
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5, 197 U.S.P.Q. 726, 731 
n.5 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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the impact of the economic loss there. 105 The "Injury at Place of In-
fringing Sales" mode of reasoning maintains that the harm occurs 
where the infringing sales occur because the patent owner loses sales 
there. 106 This section argues that the "Injury at Place of Infringing 
Sales" approach better identifies the actual situs of the economic 
injury. 
Courts adopting the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule often flatly 
state, without explanation, that the economic injury to the patent 
holder occurs at his place of residence. 107 These conclusory state-
ments probably result from an intuitive sense that the patent owner 
suffered economic harm, affecting his income where he resides. On its 
face, this analysis appeals to common sense, but closer scrutiny reveals 
several flaws in this approach. First, as shown in section III.A, identi-
fying the residence of the patent owner may prove diffi.cult. 108 
Second, many courts have determined that economic loss occurs 
where infringing sales are made because the patent owner loses busi-
ness there. 109 Arguably, the patent owner loses not just sales, but also 
goodwill in the jurisdiction.110 Purchasers of the infringing product 
will give credit for the patented innovation to the infringer, rather 
than the patent holder. The patent holder also loses the benefit of 
greater name recognition where the infringing sales are made. The 
combination of losing potential customers and decreased name recog-
nition can lead to a loss of future sales - a potentially serious eco-
nomic injury. The patent owner, therefore, actually suffers injury 
where infringing sales are made. 
Indeed, courts have followed this reasoning in other areas of intel-
lectual property. Courts have determined that trademark infringe-
ment occurs where infringing sales are made. 111 In these cases, courts 
focus on both the economic loss from lost sales and the loss of good-
will suffered by the holder of the trademark. 112 Both injuries are 
105. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
107. Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 
1836 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Infringement "has its economic impact on Acrison outside of Illinois."). 
108. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. The identification of the residence of the 
patent owner is problematic in the interpretation of the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach for 
determining both where the patent owner's intangible property is located and where the patent 
owner suffers economic harm. 
109. Interface Biomedical Lab. v. Axiom Medical, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 731, 738-40, 225 
U.S.P.Q. 146, 151-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
110. See Standard Mailing Machs. Co. v. Ditto, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 228, 47 U.S.P.Q. IO (D. 
Mass. 1940) (corporation's goodwill built up by infringing plaintiff's patent); Motor Improve-
ments, Inc. v. A.C. Spark Plug Co., 5 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Mich. 1934) (corporations acquired 
"good will of great value" due to the effectiveness of their product), revd. on other grounds, 80 
F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1935). The argument in the text assumes the patent holder sells a product 
covered by the patent. 
111. la JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE§ 8.04 (1991). 
112. Keds Corp. v. Renee Intl. Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 218, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810 
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deemed to occur where the infringing sales are made. 113 A number of 
courts follow this approach in copyright infringement actions as 
we11.114 
Third, applying the "Injury at Place of Patent" mode of reasoning 
would have negative implications for other types of tortious injuries. 
Most torts cause some type of economic injury. A consistent applica-
tion of this approach would allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over a 
defendant merely because the defendant had caused some injury to a 
resident of the state.115 Only the fortuitous circumstance of the plain-
tiff's residence would connect the forum with the tort; a result which 
likely violates the defendant's due process rights and could lead to fo-
rum shopping.116 In order to prevent such a result, New York courts 
have declared jurisdiction improper in ordinary tort cases under these 
circumstances unless some injury would have occurred in New York 
even if the plaintiff did not reside there. 117 This test distinguishes be-
tween cases where economic harm merely results from the tort and 
where economic harm comprises an integral part of the tort itself. In 
other words, an economic loss suffered by a state resident does not, in 
and of itself, provide the state with a jurisdictional interest. Rather, 
the economic loss must have resulted from some event which also oc-
curred in the state. In patent infringement cases, then, economic harm 
provides an illusory connection between the defendant and the plain-
tiff's residence and, consequently, should carry no jurisdictional 
significance. 
Fourth, the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule contradicts the mini-
mum contacts inquiry118· required to establish jurisdiction consonant 
with the requirements of due process. Instead of focusing on where 
the defendant has caused economic harm, the "Injury at Place of Pat-
ent" theory focuses only on the fact that the plaintiff has suffered eco-
nomic loss. Asserting jurisdiction under such an approach would 
justify assertions of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the 
(1st Cir. 1989). It is important to keep these analogies in perspective, as trademark and copy-
right infringement cause injuries to the owners of the intellectual property that are slightly differ-
ent from those caused by patent infringement. "The antics of the clown are not the paces of the 
cloistered cleric." Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929). 
113. See Keds Corp., 888 F.2d at 218-19; Land-0-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 708 
F.2d 1338, 1340-43, 219 U.S.P.Q. 281, 282-84 (8th Cir. 1983); Hertz Sys., Inc. v. Hervis Corp., 
549 F. Supp. 796, 220 U.S.P.Q. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
114. See, e.g., Arbitron Co. v. E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 400, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. 
Supp. 854, 858, 213 U.S.P.Q. 540, 543-44 (N.D. Ga. 1981), revd. on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 
(11th Cir. 1983). 
115. Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1309, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36, 41-42 
(E.D. Mich. 1976). 
116. Amburn, 423 F. Supp. at 1309, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 42. 
117. See Interface Biomedical Lab. v. Axiom Medical, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 731, 738, 225 
U.S.P.Q. 146, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff's contacts with the forum. In other words, it would substitute 
the plaintiff's contacts with the forum, i.e., the plaintiff's place of resi-
dence, for the required minimum contacts of the defendant with the 
forum. 119 As the Supreme Court noted, "[s]uch an approach is forbid-
den by International Shoe and its progeny."120 The "Injury at Place of 
Infringing Sales" approach maintains a proper focus on the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum because the defendant's products were 
sold in the forum state. 
A patent owner suffers actual economic injury, both in terms of 
lost sales and lost goodwill, where infringing sales are made. This 
characterization harmonizes patent infringement with the current 
treatment of trademark and copyright infringement.121 In contrast, 
the "Injury at Place of Patent" method of analysis is flawed because a 
literal application of the economic harm facet of the approach would 
lead courts to improperly assert jurisdiction in other common tort 
suits. The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule, therefore, better 
characterizes the situs of the economic injury occurring to the patent 
owner. 
C. The Failure of the ''Injury at Place of Patent" Approach 
Under Uniform Adoption 
As demonstrated in sections III.A and III.B, the reasoning under-
lying the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach has several defects, and 
the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" approach more correctly 
characterizes the patent owner's injury. This section shifts the focus 
from the reasoning underlying the two approaches to practical 
problems resulting from even a uniform application of the "Injury at 
Place of Patent" rule. First, venue requirements may make joinder of 
U.S. distributors with the alien infringer impossible under this theory. 
Second, due process requirements alone could immunize an alien in-
fringer under the "Injury at Place of Patent" method of analysis. 
Third, because some federal courts must continue to follow the "Act 
of Infringement" rule, 122 even consistent application of the "Injury at 
Place of Patent" rule by the remaining jurisdictions will result in im-
munity for alien infringers in some cases. The "Injury at Place of In-
fringing Sales" approach avoids these dilemmas. These problems are 
fundamental, because even if every jurisdiction which must focus on 
the situs of the tortious injury adopted the "Injury at Place of Patent" 
rule, all three difficulties would remain. As this section argues, courts 
should reject the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach both because of 
119. Amburn, 423 F. Supp. at 1309, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 42. 
120. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (citing International Shoe Co. v Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
121. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra section 11.C. 
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the flawed reasoning behind it, and the quandaries that its application · 
creates. 
1. The Difficulty of Joining U.S. Distributors 
The "Injury at Place of Patent" rule may prevent the patent owner 
from obtaining full relief because venue restrictions may bar joinder of 
any U.S. distributors as defendants in the patent owner's home dis-
trict. In a patent infringement suit, venue is proper with respect to a 
domestic distributor if (1) the defendant resides in the district, or 
(2) the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regu-
lar and established place of business in the district. 123 Under the re-
cent amendment of the general federal venue statute, as interpreted by 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v. 
Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 124 a corporate defendant is deemed to re-
side in any district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdic-
tion. Because this decision greatly reduces the jurisdictional barrier 
presented by venue requirements, this discussion assumes that any 
U.S. distributor is a corporation. As previously discussed, the "Injury 
at Place of Patent" approach maintains that in personam jurisdiction 
over the alien defendant is proper only in the district where the patent 
owner resides. A U.S. distributor could not be joined in the same suit 
if it was not doing business, and if no infringing sales were made, in 
the district where the patent owner resides because the action would 
fail to meet venue requirements. 
The case of Acrison, Inc. v. Control and Metering Ltd., 125 discussed 
earlier, illustrates this problem. The U.S. distributor did not challenge 
jurisdiction because it resided in the district. The court held that it 
could not assert jurisdiction over the alien corporation, however, be-
cause the patent owner did not reside in the district. 126 If Acrison, a 
New Jersey corporation, attempted to bring a new suit in New Jersey, 
the court would likely have transferred venue as to the U.S. distributor 
back to the Northern District of Illinois, the place of infringing sales, 
unless infringing sales had been made in New Jersey. Venue require-
ments, then, may makejoinder of both the-alien infringer and any U.S. 
distributor in the same action impossible under the "Injury at Place of 
Patent" method of analysis. 
The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule avoids this problem. 
At least one U.S. distributor could always be joined because the dis-
123. See supra note 22. The venue requirement of a regular and established place of business 
is more stringent than the requirement that a corporation be doing busiitess in the state for 
purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction under a state long arm statute. E.g .. Brunswick Corp. 
v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983). 
124. 917 F. Supp. 1445, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 
(1991). 
125. 730 F. Supp. 1445, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
126. Acrison, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1836. 
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tributor would be subject to personal jurisdiction wherever infringing 
sales had been made, under either a tort provision or "doing-business" 
provision of a state long-arm statute. Under the new statute as inter-
preted in VE Holding Corp., venue is proper as to the distributor wher-
ever personal jurisdiction exists. 127 Even if only one distributor could 
be joined, the patent owner could pursue a single suit by selecting the 
home forum of the U.S. distributor that made the greatest number of 
infringing sales. Overall, the plaintiff would have greater flexibility in 
joining defendants under the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" 
mode of reasoning. 
This result has obvious implications for judicial economy. To ob-
tain full relief, a patent owner may have to bring two suits under the 
"Injury at Place of Patent" approach. Besides further clogging the 
dockets of the federal courts, the burden of multiple litigation creates 
great hardship to a patent owner, especially if the patent owner is a 
small business. The difficulty of joining U.S. distributors, therefore, 
provides the first practical reason to reject the "Injury at Place of Pat-
ent" approach. 
2. Immunizing Aliens Through Due Process Requirements 
Due process requirements may have the effect of immunizing an 
alien infringer from suit under the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule. If 
no infringing sales have occurred within the district where the patent 
owner resides, the alien may have no contacts with the forum. With-
out such minimum contacts, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a 
defendant. 128 In such a case, the alien would be immune from suit129 
unless the court adopted the aggregate contacts theory. This contro-
versial approach to due process minimum contacts in patent infringe-
ment cases considers the aggregate contacts of the alien defendant 
with the United States as a whole, rather than with the forum itself. 130 
The minority of courts which apply this theory deduce that because a 
federal right is involved, a court does not violate principles of fairness 
when it considers the defendant's aggregate contacts with the United 
States because a defendant who infringes a federally created right 
should reasonably expect to be amenable to suit in any federal 
court. 131 Courts that reject this analysis note that jurisdiction would 
127. VE Holding Corp .• 917 F. Supp. 1445, 16 U.S.P.Q. 1614; see supra note 124 and accom-
panying text. 
128. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
129. See Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728, 179 U.S.P.Q. 
486, 490 (D. Utah 1973); see also Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 291, 188 
U.S.P.Q. 255, 258 (D. Conn. 1975). 
130. Antonious v. Kamata-Ri Co., 204 U.S.P.Q. 110, 112 (D. Md. 1979); Cryomedics, Inc., 
397 F. Supp. at 290, 188 U.S.P.Q. at 258; Engineered Sports Products, 362 F. Supp. at 728, 179 
U.S.P.Q. at 490. 
131. See Cryomedics, Inc., 391 F. Supp. at 290, 188 U.S.P.Q. at 257-58. 
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only be proper if Congress had provided for nationwide service of 
process. 132 
The "Injury at Place of Patent" rule would obviously not immu-
nize an alien under the aggregate contacts theory. Under the more 
common minimum contacts approach, however, the alien would nor-
mally have no contacts with the forum if no sales were made in the 
forum district. 133 If an alien producer's U.S. distributor carefully 
avoids selling infringing products in the patent owner's district of resi-
dence, traditional due process principles and the "Injury at Place of 
Patent" method of analysis would immunize the alien manufacturer 
from suit. Until the Supreme Court accepts the aggregate contacts 
theory, immunity remains possible in a number of jurisdictions. 
The "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule avoids this harsh 
result. Where substantial infringing sales have been made, the alien is 
held to have the requisite minimum contacts, even in the paradigmatic 
case.134 Although small in number, contacts can become constitution-
ally significant when directly related to the cause of action. Some 
cases therefore suggest that even a small number of sales in the forum 
may be enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. 135 The due 
process minimum contacts requirement thus provides the second prac-
tical reason to reject the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach. 
3. ''Act of Infringement" Approach Immunity 
Uniform adoption of the "Injury at Place of Patent" rule could 
also immunize an alien defendant if the patent owner's state of resi-
dence focuses on the tortious act in determining the situs of the tort 
under its long-arm statute. In such a state, the federal court, bound by 
the state's interpretation of its long-arm statute, must follow the "Act 
of Infringement" theory. As noted above,136 some states focus their 
long-arm inquiry solely on the tortious act, rather than on the tortious 
injury. 137 The first hypothetical in section II.D demonstrated that an 
alien could be immune from suit if its U.S. distributor did not make 
sales in the patent owner's state of residence and that state followed 
the "Act of Infringement" rule. 138 As long as the alien defendant 
132. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 297, 226 U.S.P.Q. 305, 310 (3d. Cir. 
1985). 
133. See, e.g., Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 200 U.S.P.Q. 36 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976). 
134. Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 485, 490-91 (E.D. Mich. 1978); see note 11 
and accompanying text. 
135. See, e.g., Huchel v. Sybron Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 133, 136 (S.D. Tex. 1980); see also la 
GILSON, supra note 111, at§ 8.04 (U.S. Supreme Court decision in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), may have set a lower threshold for obtaining jurisdiction.). 
136. See supra section II.C. 
137. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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failed to sell infringing products in any federal district adhering to the 
"Act of Infringement" approach, a district court would dismiss the 
suit no matter where it was brought. 
As a result, even if every district court which must focus on the 
place of tortious injury were to adopt the "Injury at Place of Patent" 
mode of reasoning as to where the injury of patent infringement oc-
curs, some defendants would remain immune from suit because some 
states will continue to focus on where the tortious act occurs. Because 
federal courts cannot dictate uniform interpretation of state long-arm 
statutes, 139 this problem will likely persist. The "Injury at Place of 
Infringing Sales" rule avoids this outcome because both the "Act of 
Infringement" approach and the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" 
theory result in proper jurisdiction where infringing sales have been 
made. Even if federal courts were to agree uniformly that the "Injury 
at Place of Patent" mode of reasoning correctly characterizes the in-
jury of patent infringement, they should adopt the "Injury at Place of 
Infringing Sales" rule because it avoids the clash between the "Act of 
Infringement" approach and the "Injury at Place of Patent" theory 
and produces consistent results for any fact pattem.140 The possibility 
of immunity from suit for alien infringers, resulting from the varying 
interpretations of state long-arm statutes, provides the third practical 
problem with the "Injury at Place of Patent" approach. 
CONCLUSION 
A careful analysis of the nature of the injuries caused by patent 
infringement reveals that the "Injury at Place of Infringing Sales" rule 
better characterizes the nature of these injuries. In addition, even if 
courts uniformly adopted the "Injury at Place of Patent" theory, sev-
eral practical problems would remain that would lead to potential im-
munity for alien infringers. Because the "Injury at Place of Infringing 
Sales" approach avoids these practical problems and the necessity of 
resolving the question of whether states should focus on the locus of 
the tortious act or the tortious injury, it should be uniformly adopted 
by all the district courts that must focus on the situs of the tortious 
injury. Uniform adoption would allow a patent owner to sue an alien 
in any district where infringing sales were made, thus eliminating the 
possibility of immunity in paradigmatic cases such as those detailed in 
the hypotheticals above. 
In recent years, Congress has attempted to expand patent rights to 
better prntect patent holders against infringement by aliens. District 
139. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
140. Consistency of result is an important goal. Congress created the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit to achieve consistency in patent cases by avoiding the "contradictory deci-
sions often issued by the 12 existing Courts of Appeal and seldom untangled by the Supreme 
Court." Dwyer et al., supra note 2, at 79. 
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courts should further this objective by uniformly adopting the "Injury 
at Place of Infringing Sales" rule. Effective enforcement of patent 
laws against alien corporations is much more difficult if some infring-
ers are immune from suit. Until Congress or the Supreme Court pro-
vides for a uniform rule, the district courts must achieve uniformity on 
their own. 
